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Abstract 
What does representation mean when applied to international organizations? While many scholars working on 
normative questions related to global governance often make use of the concept of representation, few have 
addressed specifics of applying the concept to the rules and practices by which IOs operate. This article examines 
representation as a fundamental, albeit often neglected, norm of governance which, if perceived to be deficient or 
unfair, can interfere with other components of governance, as well as with performance of an organization’s core tasks 
by undermining legitimacy. We argue that the concept of representation has been neglected in the ongoing debates 
about good governance and democratic deficits within IOs. We aim to correct this by drawing on insights from 
normative political theory considerations of representation. The article then applies theoretical aspects of 
representation to the governance of the International Monetary Fund. We determine that subjecting IOs to this kind of 
conceptual scrutiny highlights important deficiencies in representational practices in global politics. Finally, our 
conclusion argues scholars of global governance need to address the normative and empirical implications of 
conceptualizing representation at the supranational level. 
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1. Introduction 
International organizations (IOs) utilize various rules 
and practices that govern specific internal functions 
such as making decisions on lending projects. While 
these rules can be manipulated by powerful states and 
bypassed for political expediency, they are critical 
components to an IO’s legitimacy. At times, IOs have 
faced severe criticism and perceptions of bias, unfair-
ness, rigidity and other sources of dissatisfaction with 
internal governance. The internal governance of an IO 
involves such matters as how an organization aggre-
gates the preferences of its hundreds of members to 
make and implement collective decisions. A lot of at-
tention has focused on whether or not the internal 
governance of an IO meets certain standards associat-
ed with “good governance.” This literature has high-
lighted the real and perceived shortcomings of internal 
governance using concepts such as democracy, legiti-
macy, accountability, transparency and, occasionally, 
representation (Grant & Keohane, 2005; Woods, 1999, 
2000). Democracy, the broadest of these terms, is said 
to require legitimacy. Accountability, which is also seen 
as necessary to both democracy and legitimacy, is usu-
ally thought to require a large measure of transparen-
cy. Representation is sometimes thrown in for good 
measure, but rarely receives the close scrutiny afford-
ed to the other properties. Whereas these properties 
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are rightly conceived as complex, multidimensional and 
worthy of conceptual explication, representation is 
usually considered as if it were a plain-language term, 
with a self-evident meaning, and therefore not in need 
of systematic conceptualization. 
When scholars address representation in IOs, they 
may refer to the representation of civil society or the 
representation of states. We concentrate our analysis 
on the representation of states, although much of what 
we consider potentially applies to civil society actors 
too.1 We start from the premise that representation is 
a fundamental norm of IOs’ governance which, if per-
ceived by enough members to be deficient or unfair, 
can interfere with the other components of govern-
ance, as well as with the performance of core tasks. 
Flawed representation undermines process legitimacy, 
i.e., the belief of members that the procedures by 
which the organization’s rules and norms are made and 
enforced are fair, consistent, and thereby deserving of 
compliance. If representation is seen as flawed, biased 
and illegitimate, then the rest of the IO’s decisions are 
likely to be regarded as the outcome of a process that 
itself lacks legitimacy and is not worthy of prima facie 
compliance. As Plotke (1997, p. 27) emphatically puts it 
(in a non-IO context), “representation is democracy,” in 
the sense that, “it is crucial in constituting democratic 
practices.” Without perceptions of fair representation, 
governance reforms to improve accountability or dem-
ocratic decision-making are suspect, and decisions re-
lating to effective performance of functional missions 
may also be viewed as inherently biased.  
Before addressing the state of representation in IOs 
we first examine how the concept of representation 
has developed in the literature and how application of 
this concept might illuminate the representational 
practices of IOs. Conceptually, we posit that IO deci-
sion-making comprises a two-stage process. In the first 
stage members are assigned respective voices in the 
form of vote(s). The second stage consists of the trans-
lation of votes into seats on an IO’s apex body. Alt-
hough this is not a hard-and-fast distinction, first-stage 
decisions and procedures tend to be more formal, gov-
erned by codified instruments such as treaties. Second-
stage decision-making is more opaque and tacit, based 
on norms and informal practices. 
We find that two broad connotations emerge from 
representation that are especially relevant to IOs. One 
                                                          
1 NGOs and civil society organizations claim a representational 
role, often via informal venues. These forms of nonterritorial 
representation will have to be accounted for and incorporated 
into more state-centric models. For now, however, we choose 
to work on the conceptual foundations of representation 
among sovereign states; see Warren and Castiglione (2004). A 
case can also be made for providing representation to transna-
tional corporations. Other candidates for enfranchisement in 
IOs include the world’s “major cultures, religions, and civiliza-
tions” (Thakur, 1999, p. 3). 
construes representation as something akin to a prin-
cipal-agent (PA) relationship in which most issues re-
volve around some aspect of how the principal is 
represented by the agent in legislative bodies. The oth-
er connotation, descriptive (or mirror) representation, 
is instead concerned with how closely the composition 
of a legislative body reflects the relevant characteristics 
(e.g., size, wealth, race, class, gender) of the polity it 
serves. For example, regionalism is a central organizing 
principle of the UN System and used to help determine 
how governments are selected for non-permanent 
seats on the Security Council. 
These two meanings of representation are not readi-
ly melded into a single concept, but each has some ap-
plication to different parts of the complex array of the 
internal governance of IOs. More specifically, descriptive 
representation fits well the first-stage processes when 
member states’ votes are allocated, while PA-type rep-
resentation can be separately applied to the second-
stage processes in which members are represented in 
an IO’s apex body.2 This article demonstrates that de-
scriptive representation describes only the first-stage 
representation in IOs. Descriptive representation is not 
able to account for the wide-variety of ways IOs utilize 
the outputs from formal, first-stage determination of 
representation. Future research utilizing the concept of 
representation in IOs needs to identify this disjuncture 
between the two forms of representation.  
The next section surveys the primary meanings as-
signed to the concept of representation with reference 
to IOs. Representation, in our view, is an evolving norm 
that has been understudied by global governance 
scholars. Following this we examine the numerous 
principles IOs have employed to implement descriptive 
representation. We then apply insights from the concep-
tual discussion to a single IO: the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Our conclusion points toward areas of fu-
ture research and challenges others to more closely ex-
amine representation in international relations. 
2. Representation 
Over the long period stretching from the classical 
Greek city-states to seventeenth century Europe, the 
idea that representative government could substitute 
for direct forms of democratic participation was not 
widely regarded as workable or legitimate. Representa-
tion, as a way to overcome the limitations posed by 
scale and distance, was thought to be a decidedly sec-
ond-best alternative that is unable to satisfy democra-
                                                          
2 Representation on an apex body involves a process that se-
lects members from a more general body to the most im-
portant decision-making body and is used by most major IOs; 
those with weighted voting systems and those with one-
country, one-vote rules. 
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cy’s need for political equality (Dahl, 1989).3 But the 
ascendance of the much larger nation-state form of po-
litical organization strained the classical ideal of direct 
democracy to an extent that, by the early nineteenth 
century, “it was obvious and unarguable that democra-
cy must be representative” (Dahl, 1989, p. 29). By the 
end of the 20th century attitudes toward representa-
tion had changed 180 degrees: it was now regarded by 
its advocates as the source of the “moral distinctive-
ness of modern democracy, and the sign of its superi-
ority to direct democracy” (Kateb, 1992, pp. 36-56). 
With the proliferation of IOs in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, representational issues in IOs have 
joined the longstanding debates over representation in 
democratic polities, thereby extending the search for 
ways to overcome the democracy-dampening effects 
of (global) scale and distance, and to apply, “the logic 
of equality to a large-scale political system” (Dahl, 
1989, p. 215). As noted above, here we are concerned 
with representation of states in IOs and not with civil 
society as IOs have formal rules for the representation 
of states. 
2.1. Representation in Legislative Bodies 
Theories of representation have appropriately focused 
on the relationship between representatives and the 
constituents they represent in legislative bodies, and 
have asked questions, such as, how well are citizens 
represented by those chosen as their representatives? 
Do representatives have the a priori authorization of 
those they represent? What lines of accountability are 
drawn to ensure that the represented can replace 
those who do not provide satisfactory representation? 
Given the numerous avenues of investigation it is no 
surprise that when the concept of representation is 
scrutinized, authors add operative adjectives to label 
specific connotations (Pollak, 2007, pp. 88-89). 
Thus, in what Pitkin (1967, p. 145) terms the “cen-
tral classic controversy,” advocates of the delegate in-
terpretation contend that representatives are 
obligated to act so as to reflect as closely as possible 
the preferences of those they represent.4 The opposing 
                                                          
3 On consideration of applying democratic principles to IOs in 
general, see Dahl (1999) and Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 
(2009). While they do not devote much space to questions of 
representation in IOs, the authors demonstrate that domestic 
democracy is not necessarily weakened by the activities of 
multilateral institutions; also see Rabkin (1998). 
4 For modern applications, see Eulau and Karps (1977), Young 
(2000), and Mansbridge (2003). There are also recent studies 
that conceptualize aspects of representation in IOs. Kuper 
(2004) extends to IOs the notion of representation as respon-
siveness; in this formulation, responsive representation results 
from the activities of two types of agencies—accountability 
and advocacy—that aggregate and connect constituents’ pref-
erences to IO decision mechanisms. Rehfeld (2006) attempts a 
trustee form of representation views the representa-
tive’s ideal role as requiring that she exercise her own 
independent judgment in service of the collectivity’s 
broader interests rather than the narrower preferences 
or opinions of particular constituents. Another distinc-
tion is whether we conceive of representation in terms 
of the activities (deliberation, decision-making, law-
making) undertaken by representatives or as represent-
atives collectively “standing for” those they represent ei-
ther symbolically or in terms of one possible connotation 
of descriptive representation (Pitkin, 1967).  
This emphasis on representation as a kind of princi-
pal–agent problem, i.e., on the proper relationship be-
tween the representative and the represented,5 
provides interesting and valuable insights so long as we 
are concerned with questions of how representation 
operates in legislative bodies. But it is not as easily ap-
plied to other aspects of representation in IOs. Descrip-
tive representation is more than merely the mirroring 
of the identity and attributes of the represented in the 
representative. Here we are not so much concerned 
with the relationship between a particular country (or 
its citizens) and the individuals that represent it in a 
given IO. We are instead more interested in the terms 
on which member states participate in IOs that are 
charged with making and implementing collective deci-
sions. To what extent do the institution’s procedures 
impact the distribution of relevant attributes and re-
sources across its members? Do these governance pro-
cesses encourage or constrain the ability of a particular 
member’s (or subset of members’) delegation to ar-
ticulate its preferences and to influence outcomes? An-
swers to these questions get at the heart of recent 
debates about voice reforms in IOs and are not readily 
answered from a strictly PA approach. PA-type anal-
yses of representation in IOs can be fruitful but they 
are limited by the fact IOs are not legislative bodies. 
There is a disconnection between PA-type concepts of 
representation and their application to IOs when we 
consider what Dovi (2006, p. 2) terms the four key 
components of representation: 
1. Some party that is representing; 
2. Some party that is being represented; 
3. Something that is being represented (opinions, 
perspectives, interests); 
                                                                                           
general theory of representation that addresses another prob-
lem that arises in IOs: how to regard the representativeness of 
representatives who have come to their position by other than 
democratic means. 
5 We use the terms principal and agent in a loose sense to cat-
egorize a family of approaches to representation. For the appli-
cation of principal-agent theory to IOs, which posits member 
states as principals and the international organization as agent, 
see the selections in Hawkins, Lake, Nielson and Tierney 
(2006), especially Broz and Hawes (2006) and Gould (2006); 
see also Brown (2010). 
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4. Political context, the setting within which the 
activity of representation is taking place. 
First note that the party that is represented (com-
ponent 2) differs between the traditional conception of 
representation and representation within IOs. The 
former denotation puts individual citizens (or constitu-
encies formed of citizens) in this category, while the 
latter denotes territorial states as the represented par-
ties. To construe representation in the principal-agent 
form involves looking at components 1 and 2 and the 
relationship between them. Institutional context—
including such structural features as methods of form-
ing constituencies, proportional representation, one 
country/one vote, weighted voting, special majori-
ties—is relevant to all varieties of representation. Most 
of the literature on representation entails considera-
tion of all four components, with an emphasis on 1 and 
2. If, however, we are interested in representation in 
IOs, component 1 becomes less important and atten-
tion is shifted to how components 2 and 3 interact with 
component 4. Despite the limitations of PA-type ap-
proaches, we are not ready to throw the baby out with 
the bathwater since they may prove to have utility in 
consideration of second-stage representation. 
In sum, we contend that what Pitkin (1967) called 
descriptive representation is more suitable to ques-
tions of first-stage representation in IOs while PA-type 
analyses may have merit in second-stage considera-
tions of representation. 
2.2. Descriptive Representation 
In descriptive representation, “a representative body is 
distinguished by an accurate correspondence or re-
semblance to what it represents, by reflecting without 
distortion” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 60). Knight’s (2002, p. 24) 
approach to the representativeness of the UN Security 
Council as an “apex body”6 designates what is meant 
by descriptive representation: “For an apex body to be 
representative of the broader membership in an organ-
ization it must portray the values of the larger group; 
present the ideas or views of that group; be typical of 
that group’s geographical make-up, population base, 
and political views; and act as a delegate of that group.” 
The descriptive representativeness of an IO de-
pends on how the characteristics Knight proposes are 
filtered through its system of governance. Rogowski 
(1981, pp. 398-399) refers to this as an institution’s 
agreed social decision function. How accurately do the 
prevailing governance procedures of an IO produce a 
kind of “picture or map or mirror or sample” (Pitkin, 
1967, p. 75)? For any given member, is its representa-
                                                          
6 Additionally, the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank 
can be thought of as apex bodies in relation to the member-
ship of these IOs. 
tion comparable to that of other members of like size, 
contributions, or attributes? The representational cri-
teria Rogowski (1981) suggests tap into what is meant 
by descriptive representation in relation to how closely 
an IO reflects the characteristics of its member states. 
Is a given member represented fairly in the sense, 
“that its actual power corresponds to its ostensible 
power” under these rules? Are its preferences equally 
weighted, i.e., do they “count” the same as any other 
member’s? And, do members of like capacities enjoy 
equally powerful representation in that their prefer-
ences are equally likely to influence outcomes. The first 
of these, fairness (as indicated by correspondence of 
actual and ostensible power) is directly pertinent to the 
weighted voting systems used by many IOs.  
Cogan’s (2009, p. 219) notion of an “[o]perational 
constitution—the combination of formal and informal 
rules that together regulate how international agree-
ments are made and applied,” connotes much the 
same meaning as Rogowski’s agreed social decision 
function. In Cogan’s formulation, representation is im-
plemented in several constitutive processes of IOs: 
“The election of states to exclusive decision-making 
bodies; the relative voting weights assigned to states; 
the election and appointment of individuals of particu-
lar nationalities to high- and mid-level offices in IOs; 
and the de facto devolution of appointment authority 
for such offices to particular states or groups of states.” 
Assessments of whether a member (or group of mem-
bers) of a particular IO is fairly represented; or over- or 
under-represented; or how accurately an IO in the ag-
gregate “mirrors” the distribution of relative attributes 
across its members all depend on the prior under-
standing of that IO’s institutional context.  
Our brief survey of the literature on representation 
reveals two main connotations that are useful in appli-
cation to IOs. Most conceptions of representation fo-
cus on the relationship between the individual 
representative and the constituents she represents. 
We will suggest a role for this approach in application 
to the second stage of IO decision making. The other is 
descriptive representation, which focuses on the ex-
tent to which an IO reflects the composition of the in-
ternational system within which it operates. This 
variant of the concept provides a better fit with what 
most observers mean when referring to representation 
in IOs. Descriptive representation can be based on a 
variety of principles and is a useful concept for as-
sessing how closely an IO follows its specified repre-
sentational principles in the process that determines 
the voice of members.  
3. Representational Principles for International 
Organizations 
Some standards are needed to assess descriptive rep-
resentation to provide benchmarks against which the 
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terms of members’ participation can be indexed and 
compared. Here it is useful to think in terms of a com-
bination of representational principles (Underhill, 
2007) because it is unlikely that any one, serving by it-
self, will capture the complexities of institutional con-
text in IOs. What principles are used in IOs and how 
might they be augmented by new ones? In other 
words, representational decisions are a fundamental 
part of how IOs organize members (Cox & Jacobson, 
1974, p. 9). We consider geopolitical representation, 
regional representation, the role of population in de-
termining representation, whether votes are weighted 
or unweighted, the capacity of members to contribute 
to an IO’s missions, representation of non-state actors, 
and the representation of weaker members. 
3.1. Geopolitical Representation 
In the UN Security Council (UNSC) context, Knight 
(2002, p. 25) makes the case for geopolitical represen-
tation, defined in terms of more balanced participation 
along a North-South axis, and requiring that more 
permanent or non-permanent UNSC seats be assigned 
to developing countries. Much the same cleavage pre-
vails in other IOs, such as in the World Bank’s IDA 
where there is a division of seats between the wealthi-
er shareholders who do not use facilities and their 
poorer counterparts who do; this has been a long-
standing fault line in global governance. This is the key 
representation grievance contested in many IOs in-
volved in development policy and reform proposals 
typically call for providing more voice for developing 
countries vis-à-vis their lender counterparts. The World 
Bank’s recent voice reforms, for instance, resulted in 
major changes in the absolute number of votes for 
many emerging market economies, although this did 
not result in shifting the relative shares of votes in their 
favor (Strand & Trevathan, 2016; Vestergaard & Wade, 
2013). In sum, there are long-established practices us-
ing geopolitical factors in descriptive representation. 
3.2. Regional Representation 
Gaining legitimacy during a period of widespread decol-
onization, the representation of geographical regions 
has been well-entrenched in the post-WWII interna-
tional order, particularly in the UN. This principle over-
laps considerably with Knight’s geopolitical variant. An 
example of dissent over regional representation is the 
near consensus among those who follow the IMF that 
Europe is significantly over-represented in terms of both 
votes and Executive Board seats at the expense of 
emerging market governments in Asia and Africa (Rapkin 
& Strand, 2005). Moreover, this assessment of regional 
imbalances holds for virtually any representational 
principles one might apply. Others who argue that re-
gions are of diminished importance to representation 
point out that regions are malleable entities and that 
regionalism is a subjective construct based on senti-
ment as much or more as on geography. From this 
standpoint, questions arise about whether geographic 
regions, especially outside of Europe, are actually a 
“unit of cohesion” (Thakur, 1999, p. 9) or “simply a 
convenient way of organizing the world for electoral 
purposes” (Agam, 1999, p. 42). Regardless of which 
view one takes, there are examples of IOs using re-
gional distribution rules. The regional development 
banks (RDBs) take geopolitical representation into ac-
count as they bifurcate membership into regional and 
non-regional members, often with complex rules on 
the relative shares held by each (Strand, 2014). For in-
stance, in the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
U.S. and Canada are guaranteed a minimum share of 
votes (30 percent and 4 percent respectively) and re-
gional borrowers are guaranteed a collective share of 
50.005 percent (Strand, 2003). 
3.3. One-Country/One-Vote 
The sovereign equality of states principle is employed 
in some IOs, such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The general 
criticism of this representational principle, often raised 
in reference to the UNGA, is that the larger and more 
powerful members will not cede decisive power-over-
outcomes to smaller, less powerful members, and that 
the former therefore make certain that no matter of 
any consequence is determined by the one-country/ 
one-vote rule. For other IOs, there is not universal reli-
ance upon a system of weighted voting as many con-
sider it too closely resembling the shareholder model 
characteristic of corporate governance. Hence, with a 
nod toward the sovereign equality of states, a number 
of “basic votes” are allocated to each member. Basic 
votes can be viewed as contributing to minority repre-
sentation (see below) but for the most part they are 
only symbolically important in vote allocation. 
3.4. Representation by Population 
Another principle is the familiar and conceptually sim-
ple one-person/one-vote rule, behind which stands 
much liberal democratic practice. Proposals to imple-
ment this principle internationally have predictably run 
aground of great powers’ unwillingness to concede ma-
jority control in IOs to more populous “lesser” powers. 
In recent years, however, the emergence of more 
powerful and highly populated China and India blur this 
distinction in IOs like the IMF and World Bank. Popula-
tion, however, is rarely mentioned in discussions of 
IMF and World Bank reforms. Indeed, proposals to take 
population into account in the determination of votes 
have been dismissed on grounds that population is not 
relevant to their missions. There remains, however, a 
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modicum of support for inclusion of population (Bryant, 
2008, Appendix 1). In the UN, various proposals have 
been floated to weight votes using population as at least 
one factor to determine representation (Schwartzberg, 
2003; Strand & Rapkin, 2011). Note that using popula-
tion to weight votes moves representation by popula-
tion away from the principle of equality of (state) voters. 
For IOs to claim any sort of democratic basis it may well 
prove difficult to continue excluding population, as a 
strong case can be made that decision-making in the 
most important IOs should pay heed to the size of a 
country’s population (Mirakhor & Zaidi, 2006).7 
3.5. Weighted Voting 
Weighted voting is a dominant representational princi-
ple shaping the distribution of votes in numerous IOs. 
Borrowed from methods of private corporate govern-
ance, it is also known as the shareholder model since 
each owner of X-number of shares of a firm’s stock 
controls a corresponding number (X) of votes. The ba-
sis for weighting the number of shares held is relatively 
noncontroversial in the corporate governance case, but 
the shareholder model becomes more problematic 
when applied to governance of IOs. The fundamental 
question is what features of members should be used 
to weight votes? IOs that use weighted voting employ 
indicators of relative weight in the world economy, as 
indicated by shares of world product, trade, and re-
serves, but there are other factors determining the fi-
nal outcomes of the process (e.g., basic votes, regional 
distribution rules, political pressure by more powerful 
governments). Whether these criteria continue to ac-
curately represent the relative importance of countries 
in the 21st century is a contested question. The selec-
tion of seemingly objective economic criteria is any-
thing but simple or apolitical, as variables as simple as 
national product can be operationalized in many ways 
and the choice of measure has voting share distribu-
tional consequences. Changes in how the indicators are 
operationalized can significantly affect the relative dis-
tribution of votes. In sum, weighted voting is a com-
mon way to account for perceived or real imbalances in 
the relative importance of members, but there is no 
truly impartial way to determine relative shares and 
currently used processes are wrought with political 
maneuvering by governments looking to manipulate 
their relative position (Rapkin & Strand, 2006).  
3.6. Capacity Representation  
Capacity representation refers to the principle that 
                                                          
7 For a quite different general view on the diminished im-
portance of population, see McNicoll’s (1999, pp. 411-412) 
useful discussion of what he terms “demographic inconse-
quence.”  
those members with the greatest capacity to contrib-
ute to the success of the organization’s primary mis-
sions are entitled to greater representation because 
they perform “differential responsibilities” (Cogan, 
2009, p. 312). This functionalist principle can be inter-
preted as a criterion for allocation of seats, e.g., those 
UN members with the greatest capacity to contribute 
to peace and security are deserving of seats in the 
UNSC (Knight, 2002, pp. 26-27). The same kind of stand-
ard often arises in the context of what types of capaci-
ties should be included in a weighted voting system. In 
other words, how should capacity be defined and opera-
tionalized? Capacity to contribute may vary greatly from 
one IO to another as the missions of IOs differ as well as 
what it means to contribute resources in support of an 
IO’s mission (e.g., financial contributions, technical as-
sistance, peacekeeping personnel, etc.). 
3.7. Stakeholder Representation  
Stakeholder representation refers to the formation of 
constituencies among members who share interests or 
functionally-defined roles. This corporatist approach to 
representation is easiest to implement with multiple 
majority decision rules. In the Global Environmental 
Facility, for example, if a consensus decision encom-
passing donor and recipient countries cannot be 
reached, the decision rule defaults to a double majority 
mechanism requiring separate 60 percent majorities of 
the votes of both donors and recipients. The Interna-
tional Seabed Authority extends further the logic of 
corporatist representation: successful initiatives must 
gain the majority approval of four groups of stakehold-
ers: consumers, investors, net exporters, and develop-
ing countries. Different kinds of representational 
problems arise from the increasing number of claims of 
stakeholder status made by nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs).8 Yet another example of stakeholder 
representation is found in the International Coffee Or-
ganization where members are separated into coffee 
importers and coffee exporters with weighted voting 
within each group and decisions requiring support of 
both importers and exporters. Extending the concept 
of stakeholder beyond representatives of govern-
ments, to perhaps corporations and civil society organ-
izations, is seen by some as one way to augment global 
democracy. Such a broad view of stakeholder interests, 
however, may attenuate the willingness of states to 
delegate authority to IOs and representation is likely to 
remain focused on the state (Zürn & Walter-Drop, 
2011, p. 275.). Furthermore, non-state stakeholders in 
                                                          
8 See Kahler (2004, pp. 150-154) for a discussion of whether 
providing representation to causes already likely to be sup-
ported by the national governments of wealthier members but 
opposed by many developing countries provides a kind of rep-
resentational “double counting.” 
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global governance present an assortment of accounta-
bility concerns (Grant & Keohane, 2005). 
3.8. Minority Representation  
In descriptive representation there are often concerns 
about the representation of minority positions which 
may lead to efforts “to prevent possible tyranny of the 
majority,” by “strengthen[ing] representation of the 
numerically or otherwise weak and to grant them a 
formal role in decision-making” (Underhill, 2007, p. 8).9 
Intersecting with the concept of minority representa-
tion, as well as with stakeholder representation, is the 
idea that representation should be provided to those 
who are most affected by the policies resulting from 
the decisions of the majority. Protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights is a best-practice benchmark of 
corporate governance that could also be applied in IOs, 
primarily by improving accountability and transparen-
cy. Many IOs have implemented accountability mecha-
nisms owing in part to these concerns. In decision-
making, there have been concrete measures proposed 
to increase minority representation in the executive 
boards of the Bretton Woods institutions including set-
ting up a committee comprised of minority (debtor) 
executive directors to audit the activities of the majori-
ty and replacing the opaque consensual decision-
making process with recorded votes.10 Moreover, the 
World Bank recently expanded the number of voting 
groups dedicated to African governments in order to 
increase their representation. 
4. Implications of Representative Principles 
Consideration of representational principles reveals 
two main connotations that are useful in application to 
IOs. One focuses on the relationship between the indi-
vidual representative and the constituents she repre-
sents (as reflected in the principal–agent formulation 
applied to second-stage representation). The other is 
first-stage, descriptive representation, which focuses on 
the extent to which an IO reflects the configuration of 
the international system within which it operates. For 
many IOs where decisions are made on how to allocate 
scarce resources, some form of weighted voting seems 
necessary to provide representation that accommodates 
disparities in size, power, and systemic importance of 
states and that is capable of adapting to changes in this 
composition. In this context, voting systems amount to 
ongoing experiments in institutional design. 
                                                          
9 See Guinier (1994) and Young (2000) for advocacy of special 
arrangements to provide minority representation. Phillips 
(2003) makes a similar argument regarding the exclusion of 
women from systems of representation.  
10 These ideas have been suggested by Marfan (2001). For dis-
cussions of Marfan’s work, see Kapur and Naim (2005). 
The above principles are manifest in the represen-
tation systems of IOs but there is no systematic, nor in 
our view straightforward, way to mesh them into a sin-
gle set of procedures to represent states in IOs. Put dif-
ferently, there is no ideal system of representation that 
is technically superior and that all members of IOs 
agree upon. Not only will any such system be politi-
cized to some degree, it will also be a hybrid in so far as 
it will necessarily consist of some mix of the above rep-
resentational principles. This leaves open the possibility 
that the mix will be a kind of hodge-podge, resulting 
from lowest-common-denominator compromises and 
from the preferences of the most powerful members. 
Nevertheless, we next turn to a brief sketch of key rules 
and practices that constitute the two forms of represen-
tation to a single institutional context: the IMF.11 
4.1. Application of Representation Principles 
In order to focus our discussion, we first examine vote 
determination in the IMF. The authority of the IMF has 
waxed and waned over the last several decades. From 
a pivotal position in the development discourse as pur-
veyor of the Washington Consensus and enforcer of 
neoliberalism, the Fund’s influence diminished in the 
face of widespread dissatisfaction with its perfor-
mance, especially since meeting its “Stalingrad” in the 
form of the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990’s. 
By the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, 
numerous journalistic articles, academic papers, and 
NGO reports described an IMF wracked by crises of 
confidence, identity, credibility, budget, role or pur-
pose, and/or legitimacy, some of which, singly or in 
combination, were said to constitute an existential cri-
sis. Its outstanding loans shrank, debtor countries paid 
their IMF loans early, and the number of borrowers 
seeking new loans diminished. During the same period, 
major economies in East Asia began to explore institu-
tional alternatives by entering into currency swap ar-
rangements that operate with only modest input from 
the IMF. The institution came to be described as obso-
lete, adrift, groping for a mission, and sliding into de-
served irrelevance (Griesgraber, 2009; Seabrooke, 
2007; Torres, 2007). Then the financial meltdown of 
2007–2008 restored the perceived need for the IMF 
and its crisis management role (Broome, 2010). Re-
sources were again appropriated for the IMF and 
bailouts of developing countries on the wrong end of 
payments imbalances proceeded.  
Some of the IMF’s problems are attributable to 
changes in the world economy, particularly the availa-
bility of alternative sources of finance provided by the 
rapid expansion of private capital markets, as well as 
                                                          
11 For more detailed consideration of IMF rules and practices, 
see Strand (2014), Rapkin and Strand (2005), and Bryant 
(2008). 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 77-89 84 
the emergence of nascent regional and global financial 
facilities. Yet another source of the Fund’s difficulties 
stems from perceptions of bias, unfairness, rigidity and 
other sources of dissatisfaction with the IMF’s internal 
governance, that is, how the organization aggregates the 
preferences of its members to make and implement col-
lective decisions. Most often faulted on this score are 
perceived shortcomings in democracy, legitimacy, ac-
countability, transparency, and representation.  
The IMF is a case where some studies focus only on 
first-stage concerns while others highlight second-
stage issues of representation. While space does not al-
low for a comparative analysis, we think a focus on the 
IMF helps illustrate why our distinction between stages 
of representation is warranted. Applying notions of 
representation to the IMF is complicated by several 
features of the IO’s governance. First, the representa-
tion of members unfolds across two separate, but 
linked, stages. First-stage representation is reflected in 
the IMF’s complex system of weighted voting, wherein 
the number of weighted votes assigned to each mem-
ber is (nearly) proportional to its quota which, in turn, 
is supposed to be a function of members’ relative size 
in the world economy. The methods by which quotas 
are determined are in principle objective and replica-
ble, though in practice the process has been opaque at 
various junctures and has frequently been subject to 
political interference; perhaps akin to how the voting 
rights and representation of certain individuals in do-
mestic political systems has been historically disrupted 
by powerful political forces. Second, first-stage repre-
sentation provides inputs to the construction of sec-
ond-stage representation in the IMF’s Executive Board 
(EB). Over the past several years, reforms to IMF gov-
ernance languished largely due to inaction by the U.S. 
The reforms include central aspects of representation 
of states and highlight how concerns about how states 
are represented in an IO can undermine the ability of 
an IO to carry out its mandates (Seabrooke, 2007). Be-
fore moving on, we note that consideration of the two 
stages of representation applies to other IOs, not just 
those utilizing weighted voting systems. Most IOs use 
some form process to select members from a more 
general body to a smaller body with a lot of authority. 
4.2. First Stage Representation: Determination of 
Voting Shares 
IMF voting shares are derived from IMF quotas; quotas 
are often referred to as the “building blocks” of IMF 
governance and serve multiple purposes in the institu-
tion’s internal governance regime, including influencing 
its representation in the EB. Quotas themselves are sup-
posed to reflect countries’ relative weight in the interna-
tional economy, as determined by a set of variables.  
General Quota Reviews are undertaken at five-year 
intervals with the primary purpose of adjusting repre-
sentation to reflect changes in members’ relative posi-
tions in the world economy, as well as accommodating 
entry of new members, and making various ad hoc ad-
justments. At least in principle then, representation of 
governments in the IMF is designed to be flexible and 
responsive to shifts in the distribution of economic 
power among its members. To be sure, political lever-
age has been exercised by the major creditors at vari-
ous points in the vote determination process. 
Moreover, reasonable observers disagree about 
whether the quota regime has inflated the quotas of 
the developed countries at expense of debtor coun-
tries’ quotas. This issue entails consideration of the ef-
fects of the choice of variables, weights, and formulas 
used to determine quotas. 
Until 2008, quotas were derived from, but not 
strictly determined by, a complex system of five formu-
las based on GDP, the values and variability of receipts 
(exports), payments (imports), and international re-
serves. We concur with Bryant’s (2008, p. 2) contention 
that, “adopting a better formula [consisting of the vari-
ables chosen, their measurement, and how they are 
weighted] is the single most important requirement for 
successful governance reform for the IMF.” Given their 
building block function, it is especially important that 
quotas be determined by a process that is regarded as 
transparent and fair (Bird & Rowlands, 2006). But no 
clear, persuasive rationale has ever been provided for 
the original set of variables included, the weights as-
signed to them, or the distributive outcomes produced. 
It is clear that these aspects of vote determination pro-
cedures were thoroughly politicized from the outset and 
that particular principles behind quotas were adopted 
out of political expediency. In 2008, reforms were intro-
duced including the move to a single formula. The new 
formula includes GDP, a five-year moving average of 
payments and receipts, the variability of current receipts 
and capital flows, and reserves. Share of global product 
is comprised of PPP-GDP and market exchange rate GDP 
and the variable is weighted to account for half of mem-
bers’ quotas. Arguably, this simplified formula is an im-
provement over the previous configuration of five 
formulas, though it remains awkward and intricate.  
The connection between these specific economic 
variables and the (descriptive) representation of gov-
ernments in an IO is not obvious as there are other 
guiding factors (e.g., capacity to contribute or popula-
tion) that arguably can be relevant. Principles not in-
corporated in IMF vote determination tell us a lot 
about how influential members and dominant ideas 
about representation lead to the selection of specific 
principles from a larger set of possible ways to deter-
mine representation. 
One area in vote determination that suggests atten-
tion is paid to stakeholder and minority representation 
is the allocation of basic votes. In addition to the votes 
generated by the quota process, each member country 
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is assigned basic votes. Until recently, basic votes have 
amounted to an all-time low of barely more than two 
percent of the total votes, down from the original 11.3 
percent agreed on in 1944 at Bretton Woods and from 
the historic high in 1958 of 15.6 percent. The 2008 re-
forms increased basic votes to 5.5 percent. Basic votes 
result in an increase in the relative voice of those 
members with very low quotas, but matter little in the 
representation of large vote holders. 
In sum, the determination of voting shares as an 
exercise in defining the representation of governments 
in the IMF has, from its inception, often been subject 
to political manipulation and remains flawed in the 
ways described, especially the selection of variables, 
weights, and formula(s). Let us assume for the sake of 
argument that the vote determination process, the re-
sults of which we have termed first-stage representa-
tion, yields perfectly formed building blocks that are 
then used by members as they cast votes. How then 
does this distribution of votes translate into second 
stage representation on the EB? And, from a conceptu-
al standpoint, what definition of representation best 
captures decision making itself? 
4.3. Second Stage Representation: The Executive Board 
Second stage representation involves selective repre-
sentation whereby most members are aggregated into 
voting groups for representation on the EB. Members’ 
votes—the product of first stage calculations—are 
used to form voting groups and to elect representative 
to the EB. These elected Executive Directors (EDs) de-
cide on the substantive and procedural issues that 
comprise the business of the IMF. The EB and its con-
stituencies use a consensual decision-making in which 
informal deliberations often take place outside the des-
ignated venues, votes are rarely taken, and representa-
tion therefore becomes murky and harder, if not 
impossible, to directly measure or replicate. Relatively, 
the determination of votes is transparent when com-
pared to the more opaque and indirect representation 
on the EB. Descriptive representation does not shed 
light on second stage decision-making. 
We first note that another feature of the IMF’s that 
confounds efforts to assess representation is that there 
are several informal rules used by the Fund: “Formal 
rules are…enacted through accepted decision-making 
processes. Informal rules…do not pass through these 
processes” (Cogan, 2009, pp. 214-215). “Much of in-
ternational decision making is done through informal 
processes…In no area is this more apparent than in the 
realm of agreements concerning international repre-
sentation” (Cogan, 2009, p. 227). For example, it is im-
possible to assess the additional “representation” that 
has accrued to European members from the long-
standing practice that the IMF Managing Director is al-
ways a European. Surely this informal convention regu-
lating leadership selection has redounded to European 
advantage in manifold ways. Other informal practices 
have likewise had significant representational implica-
tions such as the selection of staff (Momani, 2007). Ac-
cordingly, in the balance of the article we narrow our 
focus to the formal operation of the EB. 
In the EB, three formal rules have consequences for 
representation. First, the Fund requires the aggregate 
votes of each constituency be cast as a block. Second, 
elected EDs are not considered representatives. Third, 
the EB uses a variety of qualified majorities, which com-
bined with weighted voting underscores the power of 
the larger vote holders. Formal rules and informal prac-
tices used by the EB have a variety of consequences for 
representation in the Fund. In this section we detail 
how these rules and practices distort representation 
principles.  
The first response to questions about how first 
stage results plug into second stage decision making is, 
as Lombardi (2009, p. 16) puts it, that “[t]he distribu-
tion of quotas heavily affects the allocation of seats in 
the…executive board.” At its inception, the 39 members 
of the IMF were served by twelve Executive Directors 
(EDs), one each for the five largest shareholders and 
seven others elected by voting groups. Each ED repre-
sented, on average, 3.25 members. In consequence of 
the many new post-colonial members, by 1964 the EB 
had been expanded to 20 seats (serving a total member-
ship of 93, or 4.65 members each). Subsequent addi-
tions—Saudi Arabia (1978), China (1980), Russia and 
others (1990–1992)—increased the EB to twenty-four. 
The Board is currently comprised of seven single-
member chairs: an ED appointed by each of the five 
largest shareholders, and one each from Saudi Arabia 
and Russia. EDs from the five largest shareholders are 
appointed for an indefinite term. Elected EDs serve a 
two-year term which, according to some observers, “is 
too short…to master all the complexities of IMF opera-
tions, to establish productive relations with manage-
ment, the staff and fellow directors and to become fully 
effective” (Portugal, 2005, p. 79). The resulting differ-
ences in experience and learning are manifest in dispari-
ties in the ability, “to develop institutional memories and 
expertise in how to function in the IMF…to negotiate ef-
fectively and to shape the issues and decisions around 
which the consensus must form” (Bradley, 2006, p. 11). 
Elected EDs generally are the members with the 
most votes within their voting groups. This artifact of 
group formation magnifies the distribution of votes 
that emerges from the first stage process so that credi-
tors control EB seats. Not only is there is a strong ten-
dency for the members with the most votes to control 
voting groups, but EDs cast the total voting weights 
held by all members in its voting group as a bloc.12 The 
                                                          
12 See Strand and Retzl (2016) for analysis of selective repre-
sentation and voting groups in the World Bank. 
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absurdity of these arrangements from a representa-
tional standpoint is obvious when one considers that 
members of the same constituency have at times been 
engaged in conflict yet their votes were cast by their 
ED as a bloc. Once elected, an ED can only be replaced 
at the time of the next election. As Woods & Lombardi 
(2006, p. 10) point out, any borrower country strategy 
that relies on, “[j]oining forces with one another does 
not give them adequate voting power to set or influ-
ence the agenda.” This constraint is made even more 
binding by the prohibition on splitting the votes of con-
stituencies even when members within a constituency 
have major disagreements. As Martinez-Diaz (2009, p. 
397) concludes “the voice and voting power of small 
shareholders is diluted in multi-country constituen-
cies.” Notably, recent reforms will change the current 
system of ED selection to one where all EDs will be 
elected. The fact that an ED has been elected by the 
other members in his voting group, according to Gian-
viti, (1999, p. 48), “does not create an obligation for 
him to defer to their views or to cast their votes in ac-
cordance with their instructions.” These restrictive de-
cision rules magnify the power over outcomes of 
lending countries while reducing that of borrowing 
countries. For those developing countries which are 
members of mixed constituencies their votes are in ef-
fect a kind of “dead wood,” unable to be mobilized for 
building coalitions supportive of borrower interests 
with other developing countries. Worse yet, they can 
be deployed by the mixed constituency EDs in support 
of initiatives that favor creditor interests. In this fash-
ion, the composition of the EB and its particular form 
of consensus decision making combine to strengthen 
the representation of developed countries beyond that 
already reflected in their sizeable majority of votes. As 
a corollary, whatever representation is indicated by 
developing country shares of votes is discounted and 
deeply distorted by the EB’s consensual decision rules. 
Undercutting any notion of representation is the sim-
ple fact the current process does not provide mecha-
nisms by which an elected ED can be held accountable 
to other members of his or her constituency. 
IMF governance reforms agreed to in 2008 and 
2010 tinkered with the representation of members but 
did not result in major realignments (Lesage, Debaere, 
Dierckx, & Vermeiren, 2013; Wade & Vestergaard, 
2015).13 Dissatisfaction with representational out-
comes of the reforms contributed to the U.S. delay in 
approving the 2010 reforms. Changes to how represen-
tational principles are operationalized in the IMF that 
                                                          
13 In the context of a legitimacy maintenance strategy, 
Guastaferro and Moschella (2012) consider the IMF’s 2010 re-
forms as part of the Fund’s “representative turn.” In our con-
text here, however, the reforms fail to fundamentally change 
the conceptual and practical divide between descriptive repre-
sentation and second-stage representation. 
are part of the 2010 reforms were effectively blocked for 
years since the U.S. holds a de facto veto. Now that re-
forms are approved, we note that they primarily address 
first-stage representation and do little to ameliorate 
problems with second-stage representation in IMF. 
5. Conclusions 
We argue that the concept of descriptive representation 
fits reasonably well the process of first-stage representa-
tion in IOs. Though imperfect, the vote-determination 
process allows agreed upon representational principles 
to be operationalized to establish members’ voices, in-
fluence, and votes as an exercise in representation. De-
scriptive representation, however, is not very useful to 
understanding second stage representation in IOs. Fur-
ther analysis is needed to determine if there is a PA-
type of representation that applies and helps to under-
stand second-stage representation. Such an approach 
can analyze the relationship between the representa-
tive and her constituents and address traditional ques-
tions such as: how well does a representative 
represent her constituents: As a delegate or a trustee? 
Is she responsive to constituency preferences? Is she 
an effective advocate? Is she accountable (and to 
whom)? In theory such an approach to second stage 
representation could address these questions about 
representation in an IO setting. In our brief case on the 
IMF, however, the representational practices em-
ployed at the second-stage garbles the inputs from the 
first stage to a point where the concept may cease to 
be valuable. Application of our approach to other IOs 
can help shed light on how informal processes clash 
with formal arrangements as they do in the IMF. 
In other words, what kind of representation: 
• Exists when the IO itself eschews the term repre-
sentation and expressly denies that EDs are rep-
resentatives of their voting groups? 
• Heightens the biased distribution of votes that 
emerges from the first stage determination pro-
cess so that creditors control even more seats on 
the apex body? 
• Allows EB matters to be decided in extra-
institutional venues by subsets of members? 
• Does not always permit small country representa-
tives to play a role in formulation of their constit-
uencies’ policy positions? 
• Licenses representatives (i.e., EDs) to ignore the 
interests of those who elected them by allowing 
representatives to cast constituents’ own votes 
against their expressed preferences? 
• Does not provide mechanisms by which EDs can 
be held accountable to voting group members for 
their performance? 
The point is not that all decision-making tramples 
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on the norm of representation in the various ways de-
scribed in the worst practices catalog we have assem-
bled from the case on the IMF. But for those who are 
concerned with questions of whether global democra-
cy is possible in IOs, the IMF case offers mixed lessons. 
Even if vote determination were perfectly aligned with 
members’ expectations of what principles representa-
tion should be based on, the aggregation of members 
into voting groups stretches even the most elastic defi-
nition of representation into an unrecognizable set of 
processes that may undermine legitimacy of the IO. 
The IMF case illustrates the pathologies that can ensue 
when the second stage processes are divorced from 
descriptive representation.  
We launched into this article to challenge others to 
deal more directly with representation in global gov-
ernance. The two principal connotations of representa-
tion do fit IOs but in an inelegant, indeed awkward, 
way. The first stage is best construed as descriptive 
representation in which the objective is for the distri-
bution of votes to mirror as closely as possible the core 
representation principles used by the IO. The second 
stage encompasses various formal and informal deci-
sion rules that use the first stage representational out-
puts to arrive at decisions. Instead of descriptive 
representation the more common view of representa-
tion involving principals and agents is germane to the 
operation of IOs. At present, these two formulations are 
simply juxtaposed and not easily melded into a single, 
comprehensive concept of representation. Despite the 
awkward fit, we did find that subjecting one IO to this 
kind of conceptual scrutiny highlights important defi-
ciencies in its representational practices. We believe 
similar results will be found in other IOs. Clearly the con-
cept of representation needs to be incorporated into the 
more general discourse about institutional design and 
the possibility of democratic values in IOs. 
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